The rocking chair, the chair of responsibility | Dvir Kariv

Dvir Kariv returns, three years after October 7, to the question of responsibility. He argues that a chair that does not rock after a severe failure is a danger to the state, and compares the October 7 debacle to past failures like the Yom Kippur War and the assassination of Rabin. Kariv wonders how Israel would look if the prime minister had taken ultimate responsibility and resigned, and points to Netanyahu as one whose chair has become too stable.

Dvir Kariv returns, three years after October 7, to the question of public responsibility. He argues that a chair that does not rock after a severe failure is not stability but a danger to the state. Kariv compares the October 7 debacle to past failures: in the Yom Kippur War, the Agranat Commission placed responsibility on the military echelon, but Golda Meir resigned within two weeks of the publication of the interim report. In the Rabin assassination, the Shin Bet chief and a series of officials paid a personal price. Kariv argues that on October 7 there was intelligence, there was guarding, but there was no belief in the threat. Senior IDF officers took responsibility, but Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu did not. Kariv wonders how Israel would look if Netanyahu had said: "I was prime minister. This happened on my watch. The ultimate responsibility is mine. I am ending my term." He points to Netanyahu as one whose chair has become too stable, and warns that a stable chair leads to the next disaster. The article uses an analogy to a seatbelt: the rocking chair is a safety mechanism, not a weakness.

The rocking chair, the chair of responsibility | Dvir Kariv