Track record
Forecasts and how they turned out
Every prediction NewsLI has published, with the probability it was given and what actually happened.
Each Story of the Day ends in dated, falsifiable forecasts. The stated probability is not one analyst's opinion — three isolated lenses score every candidate and the median is published. Once the deadline passes, a separate judge that never sees the original reasoning rules on the outcome from the evidence. Nothing is edited afterwards: the misses stay up alongside the hits.
Scored record
Brier runs 0 to 1 — lower is better. Skill above 0 means the forecasts beat simply predicting the historical average. Recomputed nightly over every settled forecast.
783 forecasts
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The IDF will publicly announce the destruction of at least one more significant Hezbollah tunnel network in southern Lebanon within 90 days, beyond the Ali al-Taher ridge.
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The Houthis will consolidate control over at least one additional Red Sea port city within 90 days, leveraging Iranian arms and the absence of direct US strikes. Reference class: Houthi territorial gains in Red Sea coastal areas since 2021; base rate ~70% for a new port capture per year. Confidence adjusted down because Trump's refusal may push Saudi Arabia toward alternative deterrence measures.
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The IDF will conduct at least one additional surprise drill in a different division within 30 days, following the pattern of the Judea and Samaria drill and the recent General Staff exercise Dawn 2.0.
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The leadership change in Degel HaTorah from Gafni to Asher will not lead to a significant shift in the party's stance on Haredi conscription within 90 days, as Asher's institutional loyalty outweighs generational change. Reference class: Israeli Haredi party policy shifts after leadership transitions (2003-2025); base rate ~20% for a substantive policy change within 90 days. Confidence adjusted down due to Asher's deep roots in the Lithuanian yeshiva world.
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The number of families returning to Kibbutz Kfar Aza will not exceed 80 within 90 days, given the slow pace of return and the deep trauma and lack of trust among residents.
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The controversy surrounding teacher Miriam Abu Bakr at Shirat Yam school will not lead to a formal Ministry of Education investigation or policy change within 30 days, as the issue remains localized.
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The Yemeni government counteroffensive will not retake Sana'a from the Houthis within 90 days, but will make territorial gains in at least one of the four governorates mentioned.
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At least one additional Arab state will publicly distance itself from either Algeria or the UAE within 30 days of the severance announcement.
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The Supreme Court will reject Lt. Col. A's appeal to prevent the disclosure of his identity within 30 days, upholding the lower court's ruling that public interest outweighs privacy. Reference class: Israeli Supreme Court rulings on military gag orders and privacy (2015-2025); base rate ~65% for upholding lower court decisions in national security cases. Confidence adjusted up due to Judge Vardi's explicit finding of massive prior publicity.
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The Ministry of Education will not announce a national program to address the PISA decline within 30 days, as the election campaign shifts focus away from long-term reform.
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The Netanyahu bloc will not reach 61 seats in the October 27 election, given the fragmentation on the right and the failure to recruit Haddad. Reference class: Israeli right-wing bloc performance in elections with threshold-dwelling parties (2003-2025); base rate ~30% for reaching 61 seats. Confidence adjusted up due to Winter's marginal position and the 640,000 first-time voters who lean anti-Netanyahu.
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The number of Haredi deserters arrested at border crossings will increase over the next 30 days as Rosh Hashanah approaches, with at least 100 total arrests reported by mid-October.
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The Ministry of Education will not announce a national program to combat bullying in schools within 90 days, despite Herzog's declaration of a state of emergency.
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The Houthi attacks on Saudi cities will not trigger a formal activation of the Mecca Agreement's military clause within 90 days, as Pakistan will prefer diplomatic pressure.
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The shift in Palestinian public opinion toward negotiations will be cited by at least one Western foreign ministry as a basis for renewed peace initiative discussions within 30 days.
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The investigation into the Prinok affair will expand to include additional supermarket branches or suspects within 90 days.
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The loophole exploited by Strock and Otzma Yehudit for separate party registration will not be closed by legislation within 90 days, as the coalition lacks the majority and will to amend the party funding law before the election.
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The UK-Israel diplomatic confrontation over personal sanctions will intensify over the next 30 days, with at least one additional Israeli retaliatory measure beyond the street renaming proposal.
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The police request for an additional extension of Eyal Nager's arrest will be approved by the court within 30 days.
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The Likud's internal criticism of Bardugo will intensify over the next 30 days, with at least one senior Likud figure publicly questioning his candidacy or its impact on the party's image.
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The Syrian government will not adopt a new constitution guaranteeing equality for religious minorities within 90 days, as internal Islamist factions resist. Reference class: Syrian transitional constitutional processes (2011-2025); base rate ~15% for adoption within 90 days of a minister's call. Confidence adjusted up due to Kabawat's minority position and the segregation controversy.
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The IDF will formally integrate the new unmanned systems and AI branch into operational command structures within 90 days of its Hanukkah inauguration, with at least one documented combat use of a new AI-directed drone. Reference class: IDF branch integration timelines after formal establishment (2015-2025); base rate ~50% for documented combat use within 90 days. Confidence adjusted up due to the existing operational tempo and the Iran strike precedent.
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The UAE will not publicly confirm or deny the Haaretz report of a pre-October 7 warning within 90 days, maintaining its current stance of nondenial. Reference class: UAE official responses to leaks about private diplomatic communications (2015-2025); base rate ~25% for a definitive confirmation or denial within 90 days. Confidence adjusted up due to the UAE's consistent policy of avoiding public confirmation of sensitive intelligence sharing.
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Public debate over the treatment of Arab students in Israeli universities will intensify over the next 90 days, with at least one Knesset committee discussion or a minister's statement responding to the Adalah report. Reference class: Israeli Knesset responses to civil society reports on minority rights (2015-2025); base rate ~55% for a formal response within 90 days. Confidence adjusted up due to the report's specific allegation of 'apartheid' and the upcoming election context.
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The Ministry of Health will not announce a new method for detecting or neutralizing the brain-eating amoeba in the Sea of Galilee within 90 days. Reference class: Israeli environmental health policy changes after public health warnings (2015-2025); base rate ~30% for a new method within 90 days. Confidence adjusted down due to the ministry's explicit admission of no tools.
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The Bazan refinery relocation plan will not receive formal government approval within 90 days, given the $5-6 billion cost and the tension with maintaining refining capacity in Haifa.
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Wizz Air's expansion of 46 weekly flights to and from Israel will proceed as announced within 30 days, with no cancellations or significant delays.
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Ben-Gvir will not approve senior police officer appointments before the October 27 election, despite police threats to petition the High Court. Reference class: Israeli ministers blocking appointments before elections (2015-2025); base rate ~60% for holding the line. Confidence adjusted up due to Ben-Gvir's stated position and the election proximity.
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Gulf state public criticism of the US security partnership will intensify over the next 90 days, with at least one more senior official from a Gulf state (UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, or Bahrain) publicly calling for independent security capabilities. Reference class: Gulf state public statements on US security partnership (2015-2025); base rate ~35% for a senior official's public call for independence within 90 days of a major war. Confidence adjusted up due to the explicit calls from Qatar and UAE within 24 hours, suggesting a coordinated push.
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The US will not announce a new diplomatic framework for Iran nuclear talks within 90 days, as the administration shifts toward a military posture.
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The High Court ruling on expatriate voting will not be overturned by legislation within 90 days, as the coalition lacks the necessary majority and political will. Reference class: Israeli legislative responses to High Court rulings (2015-2025); base rate ~30% for an override within 90 days. Confidence adjusted up due to the narrow scope of the petition (100 people) and the coalition's focus on other issues.
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The Likud will not finalize an agreement to bring Gabi Ashkenazi onto its list within 90 days, as internal party resistance and Ashkenazi's conditions will stall the offer. Reference class: Likud high-profile candidate recruitment (2015-2025); base rate ~40% for successful integration within 90 days of an offer. Confidence adjusted up due to Ashkenazi's independent political history and Likud's existing factional tensions.
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The US Treasury will designate at least one additional bank for facilitating Iranian shadow banking within 90 days, as 'Operation Economic Outcast' expands its target list.
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Moumen Al-Natour will not receive a formal response from the Trump administration within 30 days regarding his request for a meeting.
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The IDF will announce a new policy regarding reservist exemptions for mental health reasons within the next 30 days, following the Ben Gurion Airport arrest. Reference class: IDF policy changes after high-profile reservist incidents (2015-2025); base rate ~45% for a policy announcement within 30 days. Confidence adjusted up due to the public nature of the arrest and the attorney's claims.
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The public tension between US ambassador Huckabee's stated positions and Israeli ministerial rhetoric on Gaza deportation will intensify over the next 30 days.
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The number of reported shootings in Arab communities in Israel will increase over the next 30 days, as the protection money racket escalates.
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The Witkoff-Kushner mission to Moscow and Kyiv will not produce a public ceasefire framework within 30 days of their visit. Reference class: US diplomatic missions to Russia-Ukraine talks (2022-2026); base rate ~25% for a public framework within 30 days. Confidence adjusted up due to the high-profile envoys and renewed US focus, but down due to entrenched positions. Expected indicators: confirming — no joint statement or framework announced within 30 days; falsifying — a public ceasefire framework is announced. Prerequisites: []
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Huckabee will not make another public visit to a Palestinian village in the West Bank within the next 90 days.
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The number of public protests in Jerusalem over Shabbat business closures will increase over the next 30 days, as secular and liberal groups mobilize in response to the Cafe in the Alley incident. Reference class: Jerusalem Shabbat protests (2020-2025); base rate ~55% for a protest wave within 30 days of a high-profile closure. Confidence adjusted up due to the coffee cart action and Schwartz's explicit call to action.
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The internal debate in Iran over the Strait of Hormuz strategy will intensify over the next 30 days, with at least one senior Iranian official publicly questioning the policy. Reference class: Iranian strategic debates (2015-2025); base rate ~40% for a public policy question within 30 days of a reported internal debate. Confidence adjusted up due to the explicit framing in the atoms.
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Milei will not secure a bilateral meeting with UK Prime Minister over the Falklands within 90 days, as the shift in tone alienates British officials. Reference class: Argentine-UK diplomatic engagements on Falklands (2015-2025); base rate ~30% for a bilateral meeting within 90 days of a sovereignty statement. Confidence adjusted up due to Milei's prior pro-UK stance and the UK's likely refusal to engage.
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The IDF will not announce the closure of any ammunition production lines within the next 30 days, despite the warning letter, as the government will likely provide a short-term budget extension to avoid immediate shutdown. Reference class: Israeli defense budget crises (2015-2025); base rate ~65% for short-term stopgap funding. Confidence adjusted up due to the public nature of the warning and political pressure.
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The public and political pressure on Netanyahu regarding the October 7 investigations will intensify over the next 30 days, as new evidence of his failure to read them emerges.
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The fragmentation of the Israeli Right will lead to at least one new party alliance or merger announcement within 90 days, as smaller parties seek to avoid falling below the electoral threshold.
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The number of violent incidents in the southern Hebron Hills will decrease over the next 90 days, as the arrest of 13 suspects disrupts the local network. Reference class: Israeli police crackdowns on organized violence in the West Bank (2020-2025); base rate ~70% for a temporary reduction in incidents within 90 days. Confidence adjusted down due to the possibility of retaliatory attacks.
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The investigation of the child-marriage activist will result in an indictment within 30 days, given Judge Melamed's ruling that the suspicion remains at high intensity. Reference class: Israeli investigations of public figures for familial offenses (2018-2025); base rate ~55% for indictment within 30 days. Confidence adjusted up due to the judge's explicit finding of danger and the existence of a signed contract as concrete evidence.
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Syria and Chevron will not sign a final agreement for the Basra-Baniyas pipeline within 90 days, as the security situation in Syria and the scale of investment remain prohibitive.
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The High Court of Justice will issue a final ruling on the Police Internal Investigations Department Law within 30 days, likely striking it down or requiring significant amendments.
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The US will not announce a withdrawal of naval forces from the Strait of Hormuz within 30 days, despite internal debate, as the risk of a global energy crisis remains high.