The cockpit failure on 10/7: "I thought we were stopping the attack"

Nearly three years after October 7, IAF pilots who were there recount the failure and explain how the corps' operational concept has changed. A Black Hawk pilot on 120-minute standby describes how they realized mid-mission that it was a terrorist infiltration, not casualty evacuation, and how they spoke with civilians from the cockpit. The corps has drawn lessons, increasing readiness by over 250%, preparing a target bank for disruption in every sector, and changing the chain of command.

Nearly three years after October 7, N12 magazine speaks with IAF pilots who were there and publishes for the first time the key lessons learned from the failure. Lt. Col. D., a Black Hawk pilot on unscheduled 120-minute standby, recounts the morning when they realized mid-mission that the event was a terrorist infiltration, not casualty evacuation. The pilots began talking to civilians from the cockpit, spoke with a Be'eri resident who described the killing spree, and landed the first Shayetet 13 force from the air at 08:30. D. was airborne for nearly seven hours and evacuated ten wounded, but in his words, against 1,200 dead and 250 hostages, it is a failure. Following the failure, the IAF fundamentally changed its readiness: standby across all corps units was increased by over 250%, a "disruption target bank" was prepared in advance for every sector that can be attacked even in total fog of war, and the chain of command was decentralized to allow faster decision-making in the field. The article emphasizes that no change can erase the failure, but presents the operational changes made to prevent its recurrence.

The cockpit failure on 10/7: "I thought we were stopping the attack"