53 years since the Yom Kippur War: The lesson we still haven't learned | Ruthi Pines Feldman and Prof. Ehud Pines
53 years after the Yom Kippur War, the authors argue that the central lesson of the war—the danger of professional atrophy in a military that fails to prepare for extreme scenarios—has yet to be internalized. They outline the operational failures of 1973, the Egyptian and Syrian successes, and draw parallels to the failures of October 7, 2023, calling for a systemic reckoning.
53 years after the Yom Kippur War, the authors, Ruthi Pines Feldman and Prof. Ehud Pines, argue that the central lesson of the war—the danger of professional atrophy in a military that fails to prepare for extreme scenarios—has yet to be internalized. The article outlines the operational failures of 1973: the surprise of the Egyptian and Syrian attack, the Egyptian success in capturing the Bar-Lev Line and establishing bridgeheads, and the Syrian success in breaching the Golan Heights. The authors analyze the main reason for the Israeli failure—a lack of military professionalism that deepened since the War of Attrition, a perception that the Egyptians are incapable of a significant move, and poor preparation of the fortification line. They draw a direct parallel to the failures of October 7, 2023, emphasizing that despite geopolitical and tactical differences, the result is the same: a military that does not prepare for extreme scenarios collapses when the moment of truth arrives. The article concludes with a call for a systemic reckoning, rejecting the blaming of individuals.