I wish this were the last column

Gadi Ezra argues that three years after October 7, Israel has yet to internalize the battle for consciousness as part of its national security concept. According to him, the lack of a structured perception and mechanism for managing hasbara (public diplomacy) constitutes one of the war's greatest failures, with implications for soldiers, academics, and the general public.

Gadi Ezra writes that three years after the October 7 massacre, official Israel has yet to internalize the importance of the battle for consciousness as part of the national security concept. According to him, at the state level, this arena of warfare is simply not considered. He defines this as one of the war's greatest failures, as the consequences are evident: military achievements are branded as war crimes, soldiers are threatened with arms embargoes, academics are boycotted, and athletes are excluded. Ezra argues that the political echelon has not set goals for hasbara, there is no coordination between the bodies speaking on behalf of Israel, and modern tools like a proper situation room or a national hasbara archive do not exist. He notes that the problem is not the people, but the lack of a demand to work together. As an example, he cites a dispute between the IDF Spokesperson and the police over a tunnel near Qalqilya, and an 11-hour silence from the Foreign Ministry during the Fly Dubai plane incident. Ezra calls for appointing one owner for the soft warfare, with real authority, who will manage it and report directly to the Prime Minister.

I wish this were the last column