How (Not) Netanyahu Saved Israel from the Iranian Nuclear Threat

Rafi Miron, former deputy head of the National Security Council, analyzes in an opinion piece four strategic mistakes attributed to Netanyahu's policy toward Iran from 2009 to October 2026, and calls for a new approach.

Rafi Miron, former deputy head of the National Security Council for Technology and Special Affairs, analyzes in an opinion piece Benjamin Netanyahu's policy toward the Iranian nuclear threat from 2009 to October 2026. Miron argues that Israel missed four strategic opportunities: not attacking in 2009, when Iran had about 4,000 centrifuges at a single site; opposing the JCPOA nuclear deal in 2015 without preparing a military alternative; conducting pinpoint strikes instead of a comprehensive attack after the US withdrawal from the deal in 2018; and striking leaders in 2025 without targeting the enriched material itself. The article notes that in June 2025, Iran held uranium enriched to 60% in quantities sufficient for 11 bombs, and that today it can reach material for four bombs within four weeks. Miron concludes by calling for a new strategic approach.