Almost 3 years after October 7: How much power does Hamas have left?

Almost three years after October 7, Hamas is far from its pre-war state but also far from disappearing. The organization retains 25-30 thousand fighters, continues to maintain tunnels, operate lathes for rocket production, distribute weapons to supporters, and smuggle arms from Egypt using drones. The gap between the severe damage to the organization and its presence on the ground was illustrated by images from the funeral procession of a terrorist, where dozens of masked gunmen were seen.

Almost three years after October 7, Hamas is far from its pre-war state—but also far from disappearing. The elimination of terrorists continues, but images that arrived the day before yesterday (Saturday) from the funeral procession of a terrorist in the Strip illustrated the gap between the severe damage to the organization and the presence it still manages to demonstrate on the ground: dozens of gunmen were seen there with their faces uncovered, and a large portion of them are likely Hamas operatives. The remaining power of the organization is not limited to the number of fighters—between 25,000 and 30,000. Hamas continues to maintain and strengthen existing tunnel routes, mainly in areas beyond the yellow line, and operates lathes for rocket production in areas where the IDF has not maneuvered and within population centers. The rockets are not being launched at this stage, partly due to fear of an Israeli response—but the production capability itself still exists. At the same time, the organization is working to preserve weapons reserves for itself. Recently, it has been distributing weapons also to residents identified with it, who are not necessarily official members of Hamas. The assessment is that this is an attempt to keep weapons available in the hands of its supporters even in a scenario where it will be required in the future to surrender the means of warfare in its possession. Another channel that is still active is the smuggling of weapons using drones from Egypt. At this stage, there is no estimate of the scope of smuggling, but the very continuation of the phenomenon indicates that even after years of fighting, the organization continues to try to rebuild its capabilities. The cumulative picture is of an organization that has been severely damaged, but still holds tens of thousands of fighters, underground infrastructure, local production capability, and reinforcement channels. Alongside the ongoing military activity of the IDF and Shin Bet, what is missing from the picture: a political move that would complement the military pressure and shape the reality in the Strip.