Why the US Again Misunderstood Hamas – Washington's Main Mistake

The Israeli daily Maariv publishes an analysis by Sagiv Steinberg on the differing perceptions of peace agreements between the West and Hamas. The author argues that the US mistakenly views a signature on a document as a guarantee of peace, while for Hamas it is merely a tactical step to buy time. Professor Shaul Mashal explains the religious-political logic of waqf, which forbids the final recognition of the enemy. The real test of an agreement is the dismantling of terrorist infrastructure, not signatures in Washington.

In an article in the Israeli daily Maariv, author Sagiv Steinberg analyzes the difference between Western and Middle Eastern perceptions of peace agreements, using the emerging deal between Israel, the US, and Hamas as an example. Senior US administration officials described the signing of a document on the disarmament of the organization and the withdrawal of Israeli troops as an unbreakable commitment by the parties. However, the author emphasizes that this approach reflects a deep 'Western ignorance.' From the Western perspective, a signature on a document automatically means a transition from violence to settlement, as they sincerely believe in the legal finality of texts and mutual legitimacy. As Middle East expert Professor Shaul Mashal noted in his article 'Hamas's Time: Violence and Compromise,' in the Arab-Muslim world, compromise is not always equivalent to peace. For radical groups, temporary agreements or ceasefires serve as a maneuver for survival: a way to buy time, avoid isolation, and wait for a more favorable balance of power. The author explains that the Western structure of treaties is based on the assumption of a firm intention to fulfill them. In the case of Hamas, the gap between beautiful formulations and reality is not a system failure but its working mechanism. A signature on an agreement can be used solely as a tool to reduce international pressure and gain a respite. Professor Mashal points to the existence of the religious-political logic of waqf, which sets a strict normative limit. According to this concept, temporary concessions and freezing the confrontation are permissible, but turning them into a final recognition of the enemy is categorically forbidden. Because of this, the West seeks a final end to the conflict, while Hamas seeks only more comfortable conditions for a respite. Sagiv Steinberg concludes that the real test of an agreement is not loud statements and signatures in Washington, but the actual dismantling of the infrastructure of terror: destroyed tunnels, decommissioned weapons, and the elimination of the organization's military potential. Israel must be guided by the logic of the enemy, not the illusions of Western diplomats, otherwise there is a great risk of finding itself in a situation where one side celebrates a long-term peace and the other only a temporary truce.