Why the Mossad believed in Ahmadinejad — and what the warning was

Intelligence warned of the risk of an Iranian nuclear breakout if the regime change failed, but the plan was still advanced. The decision to bet on regime change in Iran was accompanied by sharp disputes within the Israeli leadership and serious intelligence warnings about possible consequences. In the Mossad's presentation to the cabinet, it was said that regime change could occur within one to three years, but ministers perceived this as a quick and sweeping change. The military warned of the Mossad's overconfidence and the risk of a nuclear breakout if it failed. The Mossad considered Ahmadinejad a key figure, but intelligence called reliance on the Kurds a dangerous illusion. The cabinet was not warned that Erdogan could derail the plan.

Intelligence warned of the risk of an Iranian nuclear breakout if the regime change failed, but the plan was still advanced. The decision to bet on regime change in Iran was accompanied by sharp disputes within the Israeli leadership and serious intelligence warnings about possible consequences. In the presentation given to the cabinet by the Mossad ahead of Operation Roar of the Lion, it was said that regime change in Iran could occur within 'one to three years.' However, ministers interpreted the signal differently: they understood that it meant a quick and sweeping regime change, including the elimination of the current leader, a Kurdish invasion, using Ahmadinejad as an agent, and street protests. Many participants in the discussions claim that the operation could have succeeded if the US had not reconsidered its position on its key elements. Overall, this is a systemic failure: the strategic goal turned into an operational task without real agreement between the political leadership, the IDF, and the Mossad. In closed discussions, the military warned that the Mossad's approach was overly confident and did not account for the regime's real control over Iranian society. The research division of the Intelligence Directorate believed that if the regime change attempt failed, the risk of Iran making a dash toward nuclear weapons would increase. The Mossad presented analytical data on Ahmadinejad's influence, viewing him as a key candidate for an alternative figure. Intelligence representatives considered reliance on the Kurds a 'complete and dangerous illusion.' The Mossad feared that the Kurds might commit pogroms and presented them with 'Ten Commandments' prohibiting murder, looting, and war crimes. Cabinet members were not warned that Erdogan could derail the plan, and the consequences of a war with Iran for Israel's standing in the US were not discussed.

Why the Mossad believed in Ahmadinejad — and what the warning was