Palaces in 'Qusra'.. Deterrence Failure Fuels Settlement Appetite!

An analysis of settler attacks in the village of Qusra in the West Bank, where the author argues that the official Palestinian deterrence failure, especially after the Gaza war, encouraged settlers to escalate from land confiscation to besieging homes, cutting water and electricity, and threatening residents with displacement, amid full institutional collusion by the occupation army.

An analysis by Amin al-Hajj addressing the escalation of settler attacks in the village of Qusra in the West Bank, where the author argues that the root cause is not only the settlers' brutality but the occupation's reading of the Palestinian deterrence balance. The author notes that the genocide war in Gaza, which lasted nearly three years and resulted in tens of thousands of martyrs, produced from the Palestinian Authority only political condemnation and media stances, without a coherent pressure policy that raises the cost for the occupation. This failure, according to the author, made the settler believe that attacking a village in the West Bank would not produce a harsher response. The author describes the full institutional collusion of the occupation army, which protects the attackers instead of deterring them, and notes that violence is no longer limited to Area C but has extended to Areas A and B, threatening Palestinian geographic continuity. The author links this escalation to the E1 settlement project, which aims to isolate Jerusalem. The author calls for building a new deterrence concept through political, legal, and economic means, moving from a reaction policy to a policy that makes aggression costly.