Israel's defense chiefs rethink Gaza, Iran, Lebanon strategy three years into war - exclusive

Israeli defense officials, in exclusive interviews, outline a new consensus on maintaining security zones in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria for years, despite US pressure. They debate the extent of withdrawals, with a majority favoring a smaller Gaza buffer while keeping high ground. Skepticism about the Lebanese army's ability to counter Hezbollah persists, and there is resistance to major Syria withdrawal. On Iran, officials believe Israel's position was better after the June 2025 operation than after the early 2026 one, citing US deterrence due to the Straits of Hormuz crisis.

Two months before the three-year anniversary of the Israel-Hamas War, The Jerusalem Post interviewed top current and former defense officials to assess Israel's military strategy across multiple fronts. A new consensus has emerged: Israel must maintain security zones in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria for years to come, despite recent deals with Hamas and the Lebanese government, and rising US pressure for withdrawals. However, there is disagreement on how to handle US pressure and how much to bend on withdrawal issues to maintain American support. A majority of officials favor allowing the Palestinian Authority to take over Gaza from Hamas, criticizing Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for being an obstacle, though a minority supports his insistence on the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG). They prefer moving forward with the PA or NCAG despite doubts about fully displacing Hamas. On Gaza withdrawals, a majority are willing to withdraw to a smaller security zone, prioritizing high ground over exact percentages, with specific areas like Shejaia requiring deep IDF presence, while Rafah could be controlled with less territory. In Lebanon, officials are skeptical of the Lebanese army's ability to counter Hezbollah, viewing its control of 'pilot' areas as a public relations effort. There is debate on whether the Lebanese government's diplomatic engagement can reduce the Hezbollah threat. The 'war between wars' strategy remains a consensus, with debate on how far to go and whether to pause during US diplomatic progress. On Syria, almost no one wants to withdraw much, despite US pressure, viewing Syrian leader Ahmad al-Sharaa as a former al-Qaeda product and a potential future danger. On Iran, a majority believe Israel's strategic position was better after the June 2025 operation than after the early 2026 one, citing US deterrence due to the Straits of Hormuz crisis.