Iran's regime pays them to shoot. What happens when the money runs out? - opinion

An opinion piece examines the fragility of Iran's security forces' loyalty, arguing that financial dependence rather than ideological commitment keeps them obedient. Citing a defector's testimony, the article questions what happens when the regime can no longer afford to pay its forces, especially after the January 2026 uprising revealed cracks in discipline.

An opinion piece by Sogand Fakheri argues that the Islamic Republic's survival may depend less on ideological loyalty and more on its ability to pay its security forces. Citing a defector who served in Iran's security apparatus, the article claims that most personnel remain at their posts because they receive money, and would otherwise turn their weapons on the IRGC. The piece contextualizes this with the January 2026 uprising, during which reports emerged of security personnel refusing orders to fire on protesters, and the regime reportedly deployed Iraqi militias to reinforce domestic forces. The author notes that while the security apparatus remained broadly loyal, the IRGC's own warning against 'defiance, desertion or disobedience' suggests concern about internal discipline. The article also references the New York Times report on alleged Israeli cultivation of former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as evidence of a crisis of trust within the regime. The piece concludes that the regime's vulnerability may be economic: if it can no longer afford to pay its forces, loyalty may evaporate.