Doubles, Couriers, and Notes: How Iran Hides Mojtaba Khamenei

The British newspaper The Times, after interviewing former intelligence officers, found that Mojtaba Khamenei has not used phones or the internet for about 150 days, complicating cyber surveillance. The search has shifted to human intelligence: multi-layered courier chains, notes, and possible doubles. Experts consider recruiting someone from his inner circle key, but access is limited. Iranian authorities claim Khamenei is fine, but analysts are skeptical.

The British newspaper The Times conducted a series of interviews with former intelligence officers to understand where Mojtaba Khamenei might be hiding and what methods are being used to find him. According to experts, the key role is played not by technology but by the human factor. According to the publication, Mojtaba Khamenei has not used a phone or computer for about 150 days, making tracking him via cyber means extremely difficult. While previously technologies like hacking Tehran's traffic cameras were used to monitor his father, the focus has now shifted to human intelligence. A former senior U.S. Defense Department official noted that after the February 28 strike, security measures around Khamenei significantly increased. He said this makes human intelligence a key tool, although it faces serious limitations given the closed and repressive nature of the Iranian regime. Former Mossad officer Rami Igra compared the situation to attempts to find hostages in the Gaza Strip: despite control of the territory, their whereabouts remained unknown due to over-reliance on technology. He stressed that even without digital communications, alternative methods of transmitting information remain—for example, notes. According to him, multi-layered courier chains are used for communication, and couriers often do not understand the content of the messages they carry. This complicates intelligence work: even if one intermediary is reached, he may not possess critical information. Experts believe the most effective way to reach Khamenei is to recruit someone from his inner circle. However, this is extremely difficult because access to him is strictly limited, and by some estimates, only a few people in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps know how to contact him. Additionally, indirect search methods are considered—tracking conversations, monitoring his environment, and even financial incentives for information. It is noted that economic difficulties within the country could increase the likelihood of leaks. Separately, the possibility of using doubles is discussed. According to former intelligence officer Avner Avraham, such a practice was already used, for example, by Saddam Hussein. He suggests that Mojtaba may move between different locations, and service personnel do not always know whether they are dealing with the real leader or his double. It is also not ruled out that he might record an audio message to maintain control without appearing publicly. However, even such a recording could become a vulnerability, as it might be used to determine the recording device or location. Meanwhile, Iranian officials claim that Khamenei is fine. In particular, President Masoud Pezeshkian stated that he personally met with him. However, experts are skeptical of these claims. Overall, analysts agree that finding Mojtaba Khamenei is an extremely difficult task, where success depends primarily on the human factor rather than technological capabilities.