Track record
Forecasts and how they turned out
Every prediction NewsLI has published, with the probability it was given and what actually happened.
Each Story of the Day ends in dated, falsifiable forecasts. The stated probability is not one analyst's opinion — three isolated lenses score every candidate and the median is published. Once the deadline passes, a separate judge that never sees the original reasoning rules on the outcome from the evidence. Nothing is edited afterwards: the misses stay up alongside the hits.
Scored record
Brier runs 0 to 1 — lower is better. Skill above 0 means the forecasts beat simply predicting the historical average. Recomputed nightly over every settled forecast.
165 forecasts
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The IDF will not carry out the unspecified military action 'relating to Iran' that Netanyahu reportedly pushed for within 30 days.
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The IDF will issue additional reserve duty orders exceeding 60 days for at least one battalion within 30 days, reflecting sustained operational pressure.
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The Israeli security cabinet will approve a significant expansion of military operations in the West Bank within 30 days, including large-scale raids and arrests, but will stop short of a full-scale campaign to dismantle the Palestinian Authority.
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Russia will continue large-scale missile and drone strikes on Ukrainian cities at a rate of at least one multi-wave attack every 72 hours over the next 7 days.
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The United States and Israel will not publicly announce a new joint strike operation against Iran before the US midterm elections on November 3, with any disclosed planning slipping past that date.
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Israel will conduct at least one further long-range aerial maneuver or strike exercise toward Iran's border that is disclosed by a named US or Israeli official, extending the advance-notice pattern.
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Hezbollah will maintain or increase its publicly reported alert posture in Lebanon over the next 30 days, with at least one additional named Lebanese outlet reporting heightened readiness or troop movement.
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The IDF will conduct at least one publicly acknowledged airstrike against an Iranian-linked target in Syria within the next 30 days.
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Yemeni government forces will announce at least one additional major offensive operation against Houthi positions in Taiz within the next 7 days.
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Morocco will deploy at least 200 troops to the ISF in Gaza within 90 days.
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The Red Team's kidnapping-thwarting drills will be extended beyond the Gaza Strip to at least one additional front or command within 30 days, indicated by a named IDF announcement or a report citing a named officer.
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The IDF will launch at least one further interceptor against an aerial target over or near southern Lebanon within 30 days, sustaining the pattern of the past 48 hours rather than a single isolated incident.
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The Pentagon's CENTCOM preparation order will be followed within 30 days by at least one additional publicly reported US force-posture or readiness adjustment tied to Iran, rather than remaining a single internal instruction.
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The American company approved to map Hamas weapons-handover sites in southern Gaza will not complete a documented, publicly reported handover of rifles or weapons for destruction within 30 days.
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No Israeli strike on Iran will be publicly confirmed by the IDF or the White House within 90 days, as Zamir's block on the US-demanded operation holds.
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The Pentagon's three-day intensive strike plan against Iran will remain unexecuted within 90 days, as Trump's rejection of five extensive operations proposals indicates sustained political restraint. Reference class: US military strike plans against Iran (2019-2026); base rate ~20% for execution within 90 days. Confidence adjusted up due to Trump's track record of rejecting such plans.
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The IDF citation review for October 7 battles will result in at least 10 citations being awarded within 30 days.
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The IDF will revise its PTSD freeze policy within 90 days, following the High Court petition by 117 reservists.
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NATO will issue a formal statement condemning the drone attack on commercial ships near the Bulgarian coast within 30 days, as the first such incident in NATO territorial waters demands a collective response.
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The IDF will release a formal investigation into the security breach at the outpost between Quneitra and Khader within 30 days, as the incident raises operational questions. Reference class: IDF investigations of security breaches at border outposts (2023-2026); base rate ~55% for a published report within 30 days. Confidence adjusted up due to Maariv's ongoing coverage and the unusual nature of a terrorist reaching the outpost entrance.
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Iran will publicly test-fire a missile with a range exceeding 1,000 km within 90 days, as the IRGC's announced expansion moves from planning to demonstration. Reference class: IRGC missile tests following public range-expansion pledges (2015-2026); base rate ~60% for a test within 90 days. Confidence adjusted up due to the explicit 'work has already begun' phrasing in the announcement.
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The IDF will announce at least one additional major submarine procurement or construction contract within 90 days, as Netanyahu's stated ambition for naval leadership and the arrival of the sixth submarine signal a sustained investment trajectory.
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The number of IDF soldiers killed in operational accidents (non-combat) will increase by at least 50% within 90 days, as the prolonged deployment under Order 8 increases fatigue and risk.
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The number of foreign nationals detained in the West Bank for security-related provocations will increase by at least 50% within 90 days, as security forces intensify operations. Reference class: Detentions of foreign nationals in the West Bank (2025-2026); base rate ~40% for a 50% increase over 90 days. Confidence adjusted up due to the recent detention of four individuals and the stated policy of zero tolerance.
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The US will conduct at least one airstrike against Iranian-backed targets in the Strait of Hormuz within 30 days, as the buildup of naval assets and Trump's ultimatum increase the likelihood of confrontation.
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Russian drone and missile strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure will increase in frequency over the next 30 days, as winter approaches and power outages resume in Uman.
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The dispute between Battalion 601 soldiers and Colonel Schneider over leave cancellations will lead to a formal complaint to the Personnel Directorate or a public statement from the soldiers within 30 days. Reference class: IDF soldier protests over conditions (2020-2026); base rate ~55% for a formal complaint within 30 days. Confidence adjusted up due to the Personnel Directorate's expressed dissatisfaction with the brigade commander's position.
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Hamas will carry out at least one attack against IDF forces in the Gaza Strip within 30 days that results in Israeli casualties, despite ongoing targeted killings.
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The US will not publicly confirm or deny Iran's claim of capturing a second American AUV in the Strait of Hormuz within 30 days. Reference class: US responses to Iranian maritime capture claims (2019-2026); base rate ~55% for no public confirmation or denial within 30 days. Confidence adjusted down due to the lack of independent evidence and the potential for the claim to be denied as propaganda.
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The IDF will release a formal investigation report on the drone explosion incident within 30 days, citing safety protocol failures. Reference class: IDF internal investigations of fatal accidents (2020-2025); base rate ~70% for report within 30 days. Confidence adjusted down due to the involvement of a brigadier general-led team which may extend the timeline.
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The IDF will neutralize at least 10 additional kilometers of underground routes in the northern Gaza Strip within 90 days, continuing the current operational tempo. Reference class: IDF tunnel neutralization rates in northern Gaza (Oct 2023–Sep 2025); base rate ~8.7 km/month. Confidence adjusted down due to diminishing returns as the campaign matures.
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The IDF will conduct at least one more battalion-level raid in the West Bank within 30 days, following the activation of Division 98 and the 'Times of Joy' operation.
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The IDF will not receive the full 25 billion shekels additional budget within 90 days, as Treasury reluctance during an election period and the unresolved gap from July's 15-billion-shekel agreement will delay a multi-year commitment.
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The IDF will demolish the home of terrorist Kadri Samara in Bidu within 7 days, following the completed mapping of the home. Reference class: IDF home demolitions for attackers who killed an Israeli civilian (2020-2025); base rate ~85% within 7 days of mapping. Confidence adjusted down due to potential legal challenges or operational delays.
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Iran will complete additional fortification work at the Mount Makoush complex, as satellite images show ongoing earth-moving activity, within 90 days. Reference class: Iran's underground facility fortification cycles (2020-2025); base rate ~80% for observable work continuing over a 90-day window. Confidence adjusted down slightly due to potential diplomatic pause ahead of UNGA.
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The US will announce a formal agreement to station additional refueling aircraft at an alternative Israeli airfield (e.g., Nevatim or Ovda) within 90 days of the Ramon nighttime curfew.
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Saudi Arabia will conduct at least one more airstrike in Taiz province within 30 days, as the Houthi advance near Bab al-Mandeb continues. Reference class: Saudi airstrikes in Taiz (2020-2025); base rate ~60% per month during active Houthi offensives. Confidence adjusted up due to the confirmed Houthi advance and Saudi airstrikes on the Al-Barah Bridge.
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CENTCOM will announce at least one more engagement with IRGC naval forces in the Strait of Hormuz within 30 days.
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The IDF will announce the elimination of at least one more battalion-level commander in the Gaza Strip within 90 days.
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The EL GAIA tanker explosion in the Strait of Hormuz will not lead to a significant disruption in global oil shipping through the strait within 7 days, as the incident appears isolated.
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The IDF will not withdraw from the Ali Taher ridge in southern Lebanon within 30 days, maintaining its stated position to enforce presence. Reference class: Israeli military hold operations in southern Lebanon (2000-2025); base rate ~85% for holding ground for 30 days after a public statement. Confidence adjusted down due to potential US or Lebanese pressure. Reference class: Israeli military hold operations in southern Lebanon (2000-2025); base rate ~85% for holding ground for 30 days after a public statement.
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The Houthis will consolidate control over at least one additional Red Sea port city within 90 days, leveraging Iranian arms and the absence of direct US strikes. Reference class: Houthi territorial gains in Red Sea coastal areas since 2021; base rate ~70% for a new port capture per year. Confidence adjusted down because Trump's refusal may push Saudi Arabia toward alternative deterrence measures.
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The IDF will conduct at least one additional surprise drill in a different division within 30 days, following the pattern of the Judea and Samaria drill and the recent General Staff exercise Dawn 2.0.
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The IDF will publicly announce the destruction of at least one more significant Hezbollah tunnel network in southern Lebanon within 90 days, beyond the Ali al-Taher ridge.
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The Yemeni government counteroffensive will not retake Sana'a from the Houthis within 90 days, but will make territorial gains in at least one of the four governorates mentioned.
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The Houthi attacks on Saudi cities will not trigger a formal activation of the Mecca Agreement's military clause within 90 days, as Pakistan will prefer diplomatic pressure.
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The IDF will formally integrate the new unmanned systems and AI branch into operational command structures within 90 days of its Hanukkah inauguration, with at least one documented combat use of a new AI-directed drone. Reference class: IDF branch integration timelines after formal establishment (2015-2025); base rate ~50% for documented combat use within 90 days. Confidence adjusted up due to the existing operational tempo and the Iran strike precedent.
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The IDF will announce a new policy regarding reservist exemptions for mental health reasons within the next 30 days, following the Ben Gurion Airport arrest. Reference class: IDF policy changes after high-profile reservist incidents (2015-2025); base rate ~45% for a policy announcement within 30 days. Confidence adjusted up due to the public nature of the arrest and the attorney's claims.
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The internal debate in Iran over the Strait of Hormuz strategy will intensify over the next 30 days, with at least one senior Iranian official publicly questioning the policy. Reference class: Iranian strategic debates (2015-2025); base rate ~40% for a public policy question within 30 days of a reported internal debate. Confidence adjusted up due to the explicit framing in the atoms.
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The IDF will not announce the closure of any ammunition production lines within the next 30 days, despite the warning letter, as the government will likely provide a short-term budget extension to avoid immediate shutdown. Reference class: Israeli defense budget crises (2015-2025); base rate ~65% for short-term stopgap funding. Confidence adjusted up due to the public nature of the warning and political pressure.